-
-
adaptation
-
Maturana (1978) distinguishes between two distinct classes or categories
of adaptation -- ontogenic adaptation and evolutionary adaptation. Both
categories of adaptation "...arise through the selection of the
structures that permit the autopoiesis of the living system in the
medium in which it exists." (Maturana, 1978, p. 38) The difference is
based on the fact that ontogenic adaptation is the "...coupling of the
changing structure of a structurally plastic autopoietic unity to the
changing structure of the medium..." (Maturana, 1978, p. 38), whereas
evolutionary adaptation is the "...history of successively produced,
historically connected unities generated through sequential reproductive
steps..." (Maturana, 1978, p. 38) Adaptation "...always results from
sequences of interactions of a plastic system in its medium that trigger
in the plastic system structural changes or changes of state that, and
any instant, select in it a structure that either matches (is
homomorphic to) the structure of the medium in which it operates
(interacts or behaves) as such a system, or disintegrate it."
(Maturana, 1978, p. 39)
Cf. : ontogenic adaptation, evolutionary adaptation
-
admissible symbolic descriptions
-
Varela (1979) draws a distinction between operational explanations and symbolic explanations (Cf. comparison
under the entry for explanation). Although he
notes a preference for operational description / explanation in dealing
with autonomous systems, he also points out that (a) strict adherence to
this approach might be problematically dogmatic, and (b) symbolic forms
of description / explanation can be economical (compared to the sort of
literal or mechanistic generative simulation required for the
operational approach).
He then explores the question of when and how
symbolic explanations are permissible and useful in addressing
autonomous systems. The first step is scrutinizing the notion of a symbol, because "...in order to
understand fully how the cognitive domain of such a system can operate
and be modified, we must look at the dynamic regularities that arise
within the system and that can be treated as symbolic events." (Varela,
1979, p. 81) This leads to delineation of two primary features of
'symbols' in natural systems, of which the one relevant here is:
"Internal Determination. An object or event is a symbol
only if it is a token for an abbreviated nomic chain that occurs
within the bounds of the system's organizational closure.
In other words, whenever the system's closure determines certain
regularities in the face of internal or external interactions and
perturbations, such regularities can be abbreviated as a symbol, usually
the initial or terminal element in the nomic chain."
(Varela, 1979, pp. 79-80)
Varela then invokes the example of nitrogen base triplets 'encoding' an amino acid in a cell's protein sequences. This is 'encoding' only in the sense that the triplet's occurrence is correlated with a repetitive pattern discernible in the actual / causal (i.e., 'operational') dynamics of the cell. "But such a dynamic pattern occurs entirely within the bounds of the cell's closure; the cell itself contains the 'interpretation' for the symbol. We then chose the triplet as the symbol for the amino acids by abbreviating the long sequence of chemical steps from the internal recursion where such chemical reactions normally operate." (p. 80)
In (seemingly arbitrarily) associating triplets with amino acids, an observer is using a sort of explanatory shorthand by ignoring at least some of the operations which realize the pattern of dynamics thus denoted. "To the extent that this ignoring is based on the regularities of the dynamics of an autonomous system, this symbolic description is admissible, and it plays a useful role in the study of autopoietic systems on a larger time scale ... In the molecular examples of admissible symbols, their underlying causal chains are still apparent and accessible, and we can switch from one type of description to the other with a certain ease." (p. 80)
Cf. : explanation, operational explanations, symbol, symbolic explanations
-
aggression
-
As delineated in contradistinction with love: "... the domain of those
behaviors through which the other arises denied as a legitimate other in
coexistence with oneself." (Maturana & Verden-Zöller, 1996)
-
allo-
-
A combinatoric term derived from the Greek allos ("other; different") and used to generate a
variety of terms in autopoietic theory such as allo-referred, allonomy, allopoiesis, allopoietic, etc.
In this usage, the prefix allo- typically serves to contrast a root term with another instanced
prefixed by auto-.
Cf. : auto-
-
allo-referred (systems)
-
An early construct used by Maturana to denote those systems "...that could only be characterized
with reference to a context." (Maturana, in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xiii) The opposite of self-referred
(systems).
-
allonomy
-
A term with the literal meaning of "external law", synonymous with the
notion of "control". The opposite of autonomy (in the sense of
"self-law"). (Varela, 1979, p. xi) Varela uses this term to
distinguish a duality of "control" (or capacity for control) evidenced
by systems -- i.e., those which are "controllable" from without
(allonomy) and those whose control is a function or effect of their own
constitution (autonomy).
In The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), the term heteronomy is apparently used as a synonym for allonomy.
Cf. : autonomous description, autonomy , control, control description, heteronomy
-
allopoiesis
-
A term formed by the combination of allo- ("other") and -poiesis
("creation"). The state or character of systems whose operation results
in something other than the maintenance of their defining organization .
This term is mainly invoked to establish a contrastive alternative to
the autonomy and autopoiesis evidenced by living systems (the primary
focus of Maturana and Varela's work).
Cf. : allopoietic machine / system
-
allopoietic machine / system
-
Systems which "...have as the product of their functioning something
different from themselves." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135; Varela,
1979a, p. 15). Such systems can be defined as components of a subsuming
supersystem in which they play the part of a functional contributor. By
virtue of this "component" status, allopoietic machines can be described in terms of "purpose" (their role in the larger context), and
they may be ascribed "inputs" and "outputs" (with respect to that same
context). Allopoietic machines are therefore delineated with respect to
a teleology -- something not ascribable to an autopoietic unity . They are therefore members of the class of
allo- referred systems (to use Maturana's early terminology).
Allopoietic machines are therefore construed as such icogdo
an observer. They "...have an identity that
depends on the observer and is not determined through their operation,
because its product is different from themselves; allopoietic machines
do have an externally defined individuality." (Varela, 1979, p. 15)
This last feature derives from the fact that an allopoietic machine's
"boundaries are specified by an observer, who by specifying its input
and output surfaces, specifies what pertains to it in its operations."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 81; Cf. : Varela, 1979, p. 15)
"Since the changes that allopoietic machines may suffer without losing
their definitory organization are necessarily subordinated to the
production of something different from themselves, they are not
autonomous." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 80; Varela, 1979, p. 15)
Since the ascription of allopoiesis is a functional attribution, "...an
observer can describe an autopoietic component of a composite system as
playing an allopoietic role through the realization of the larger system
that it contributes to realizing through its autopoiesis." (Varela,
1979a, p. 52). Such an ascription neither addresses nor negates the
autopoietic status of the machine so treated. "In fact, autopoietic and
allopoietic descriptions of a system are complementary pairs, depending
on the observer's needs. They are a particular instance of ... the
universal duality between autonomous and control descriptions..."
(Varela, 1979, p. 16) Cf. : autopoietic machine.
Cf. : allopoiesis, allopoietic role, autonomy , autonomous machine, autopoiesis , autopoietic machine / system, purpose
-
allopoietic role
-
A term used to denote the functional participation of a system
(especially an autopoietic system) in
a larger supersystem, such that the participating system can be
characterized by an observer as an allopoietic machine or submachine serving as a component of the supersystem. Phrased another
way, an observer ascribes an allopoietic role to a system (participating
in a subsuming network or system) when the operation of the subject
system (in the context of the subsuming one) appears to have a purpose other than the maintenance of its (the
subject system's) own organization .
Because (by definition) an autopoietic machine's function is defined and
determined by its own organization (and the maintenance of that
organization), any analogous reference to an autopoietic role is
descriptively meaningless.
Cf. : allopoietic machine, autopoietic machine, machine, submachine
-
ambience
-
A general term used to denote the medium or milieu in which living
systems are realized. (Cf. Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela,
1980, p. 9) More specifically, the ascription of 'ambience' connotes
that within which a subject unity is embedded. This implies that
whatever character the ambience may evidence interpenetrates or subsumes
both the subject unity and whatever else is apprehended as its environs.
Such observer-ascribed "environs" are distinguished in the literature
(when distinguished at all) as the environment. As such, 'ambience' comes close to
being a construct connotative of an objective substrate for an
observer's distinction / eduction of a given subject unity.
Ultimately, however, neither Maturana nor Varela explicitly embrace this
connotation of objective status. Because their delineation of
'ambience' is qualified with respect to realization, the ambient ascribed by an observer of a living system's
ontogeny is a descriptive construct of the observer, and not a
definitive feature of the system's organization . (See Also:
Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 99) Varela (1979) occasionally
refers to this construct as ambient.
For the sake of illustration, it is safe to say that ambience is equivalent in connotation to that which
Winograd and Flores (1986) denote as the specific construct 'medium':
"...[W]e use the term 'medium' rather than 'environment' to refer to the space in which an
organism exists. This is to avoid the connotation that there is a separation between an entity and its
'environment.' An entity exists as part of a medium, not as a separate object inside it."
(Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 43, footnote 7)
Winograd and Flores' connotation of 'medium' being all-subsumptive (i.e., of both the system and
its environs) matches the connotations given 'ambience' by Maturana and Varela (1980).
NOTE: In later (e.g., post-1985) writings, Maturana has commonly employed the term medium
as an apparent surrogate for environment, although some passages can be interpreted as connoting
something more like ambience. As such, it is not safe to blindly equate Maturana's later allusions
to 'medium' with either Winograd and Flores' precise usage of that term or to Maturana and
Varela's (1980) precisely-delineated construct of 'ambience.'
Figure AmbEnv illustrates the variant delineations of 'ambience', 'environment', and 'medium'. This figure is located within the entry for 'environment'.
Cf. : ambient, environment, medium
-
ambient
-
A synonym for ambience occasionally used by Varela in Principles of Biological Autonomy
(1979).
Cf. : ambience
-
analytic (explanatory paradigm)
-
A label used by Varela (1979, p. 10) to connote rational explanations
framed with respect to reduction of phenomena to atomic elements. A
synonym for scientific reductionism. The opposite of synthetic
explanatory approaches.
-
"Anything said is said by an observer."
-
A famous (and thematically central) quotation attributable to Humberto
Maturana. This declaration set the stage for constructing a theory of
cognition which focuses upon the cognitive system which both evidences
this "cognition" and which is in fact attempting to describe and explain
it. It occurs in the earliest documents of the literature base:
Neurophysiology of Cognition (Maturana, 1970a, p. 4) and Biology of
Cognition (Maturana, 1970b, reprinted as the first section of
Autopoiesis and Cognition - Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 8).
This phrase is sometimes quoted as "Everything said is said by an
observer...", as in the passage: "Everything said is said by an observer
to another observer who can be himself or herself." (Cf. Maturana, 1978)
Cf. : observer
-
asymmetry
-
A term used by Varela (1979, p. 101) to denote the form of duality for which his Star statement / operator applies -- i.e., a form in which the two terms are reciprocally related across levels of referentiality (as opposed to within one such level -- i.e., symmetry).
A more detailed overview of the context for this dichotomy (as well as Figure SymAsym illustrating it) can be found in the entry for Star.
Cf. : complementarity, Star, symmetry
-
auto-
-
A combinatoric term derived from the Greek auto- (connoting "self";
"same") and used in the generation of much of the theory's terminology.
In this usage, auto- typically distinguishes a root term from the
complementary prefix allo- ("other") to denote reference or
applicability to the same object or process (as opposed to a
distinguishable other).
Cf. : allo-
-
autonomous description
-
Per Varela (1979), one of the two major classes of system description (the other being control
descriptions).
-
autonomous machine (system)
-
Any machine / system exhibiting autonomy (in Varela's specific sense).
A member of the class which subsumes autopoietic systems. This general
class is defined by organizational closure in these systems'
constitution. In the following two definitions (with some variation in
phrasing), Varela states autonomous systems are:
A. "...mechanistic (dynamic) systems defined as a unity by their
organization. We shall say that autonomous systems are organizationally
closed. That is, their organization is characterized by processes such
that (1) the processes are related as a network, so that they
recursively depend on each other in the generation and realization of
the processes themselves, and (2) they constitute the system as a unity
recognizable in the space (domain) in which the processes exist."
(Varela, 1979, p. 55)
B. '...defined as a composite unity by a network of interactions of
components that (i) through their interactions recursively regenerate
the network of interactions that produced them, and (ii) realize the
network as a unity in the space in which the components exist by
constituting and specifying the unity's boundaries as a cleavage from
the background...' (Varela, 1981a, p. 15)
Cf. : autonomy , autopoiesis , autopoietic machine / system, organizational closure
-
autonomy
-
-
1.
-
The definitive quality of the class of systems subsuming autopoietic
systems. This general class is defined by organizational closure in
these systems' constitution. The concept is defined indirectly, through
definition of the autonomous machine / system which exhibits this
quality. The difference between autonomy and autopoiesis is that
autopoietic systems must produce their own components in addition to
conserving their organization and specifying their boundaries in the
space of realization.
-
2.
-
"Autonomy is the distinctive phenomenology resulting from an autopoietic organization: the realization of the autopoietic organization is the product of its operation."
(Varela, Maturana & Uribe, 1974, p. 188)
In the early literature, a label connoting "The condition of
subordinating all changes to the maintenance of the organization.
Self-asserting capacity of living systems to maintain their identity
through the active compensation of deformations." (Maturana & Varela,
1980, p. 135) In this early, generic sense the term connoted "...the
central feature of the organization of the living" (Maturana, in Maturana & Varela,
1980, p. xvii; also see Maturana, 1980a, p. 45) Although it is
obviously closely related, this early usage of the term should not be
construed as precisely synonymous with Varela's (1979) more rigorous
(and distinct) usage (1. above).
-
3.
-
In generic usage, the notion of self-guidance or self-control -- literally, "self-law." (Varela,
1979, p. xi). The opposite of allonomy or control.
Regardless of the specific above-cited nuance employed, 'autonomy' is the central principle or heuristic around which Maturana and Varela's theories revolve. As a subject for scientific enquiry, 'autonomy' entails a significant divergence from conventional models and techniques. Much of Varela's solo work during the 1970's concentrated on developing new tools with which to address systems as autonomous machines. In doing so, he laid out a map relating (a) the characterization of a system (in and of itself) as either autonomous or allonomous (subject to extrinsic control) versus (b) the mode of representation by which said system is modeled (either in terms of its closure or its observed interactions). This summary overview of the methodological landscape is reproduced in Table CharRep below.
TABLE CHARREP:
Varela's Overview of System Characterization versus System Representation
|
Adapted from Varela (1979)
(p. 206, Table 13.1)
|
BASIS FOR REPRESENTATION:
|
BASIS FOR
CHARACTERIZATION:
|
Closure
|
Interaction
|
|
Autonomy
|
-
identity
-
connectivity
-
indefinite recursion
-
eigenbehavior
-
stability
|
-
perturbations - compensations
-
cognitive domain
-
resilience
-
ontogenesis
|
|
Control
|
-
coordination of parts
-
hierarchical levels
-
finite recursion
-
signal flow
-
state transitions
|
-
black box
-
dissipative structures
-
input - output
|
Table CharRep is but a sketch of elements methodologically relevant to the study of systems as autonomous unities. The reader is invited to compare this Table's contents in relation to (e.g.) the dichotomy between the recursive and behavioral views of particular unities, the distinction between symbolic and operational explanations, and other constructs concerning observation / description / explanation.
Cf. : autonomous machine / system, autopoiesis , autopoietic machine (system), closure, Closure Thesis, organizational
closure
-
autopoiesis
-
-
1.
-
The theoretical construct definitive of the manner of operation of that
class of systems that includes living systems. This term, combined from
the Greek auto- (self) and poiesis
(creation/production), was coined by Maturana in (approximately) 1972
(Cf. Maturana's comments in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xvii). Often loosely
translated as 'self-creation' or 'self-production', the term connotes
the process or dynamic by which an autopoietic machine / system maintains its autopoietic organization (via
intrinsic processes of production of components realizing this
particular organization). More specifically, autopoiesis is attributed to a
machine (delineated as a a network of processes)
which through that network of processes produces the components that:
"(1) through their interactions and transformations continuously
regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that
produced them; and
(2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in
which they [the components] exist by specifying the topological domain
of its realization as such a network."
(Varela, 1979, p. 13)
In the primary literature, autopoiesis is not directly defined as a
process. Instead it is defined indirectly, on the basis of how an 'autopoietic machine'
operates. There are, in fact, very few instances in the primary literature where 'autopoiesis' is substantively treated in and of itself, and then only as a process characteristic of 'self-production' or 'homeostatic organization' -- constructs themselves framed mechanicistically with respect to the subject system's architectonics. For example, Varela (1979, pp. 24-26) comes closest to addressing 'autopoiesis' directly in the course of discussing productions of relations in a given system:
"What makes this system a unity with identity and individuality is that all the relations of production are coordinated in a system describable as having an invariant organization. In such a system any deformation at any place is compensated for ...by keeping its organization constant as defined by the relation of the productions that constitute autopoiesis. The only thing that defines the cell as a unity (as an individual) is its autopoiesis, and thus, the only restriction put on the existence of the cell is the maintenance of autopoiesis."
(Varela, 1979, p. 26, emphasis in the original)
"...[A]utopoiesis may arise in a molecular system if the relations of production are concatenated in such a way that they produce components specifying the system as a unity that exists only while it is actively produced by such concatenation of processes. This is to say that autopoiesis arises in a molecular system only when the relation that concatenates these relations is produced and maintained constant through the production of the molecular components that constitute the system through this concatenation."
(Varela, 1979, pp. 26-27)
NOTE: Given the above distinctions and qualifications about the nature and origin of the construct 'autopoiesis', the details on what makes a composite unity (system)
'autopoietic' are therefore to be found under the entries for autopoietic machine and autopoietic organization.
The strict, though indirect, definition of autopoiesis proposed in the early papers was
intended to provide a basis for overcoming vague or problematical
characterizations of living systems -- particularly those which represented vitalistic explanation of biological phenomena. As Maturana (1980a, p. 45) put it,
the construct of autopoiesis:
"...resulted from the direct attempt ... to provide a complete
characterization of the organization that makes living systems
self-contained autonomous unities, and that makes explicit the relations
among their components which must remain invariant under a continuous
structural transformation and material turnover."
This passage reinforces the viewpoint that it is the constitutive organization of an autopoietic system which is primary in delineating autopoiesis. This is reflected even in the less formal popular account given in The Tree of Knowledge (Maturana & Varela, 1987, 1992):
"When we speak of living beings, we presuppose something in common between them; otherwise we wouldn't put them in the same class we designate with the name 'living.' What has not been said, however, is: what is the organization that defines them as a class? Our proposition is that living beings are characterized in that, literally, they are continually self-producing. We indicate this process when we call the organization that defined them an autopoietic organization."
(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 43, emphasis added)
Having said that, Maturana and Varela proceed (as they have consistently done in the more formal literature) to delineate the autopoietic organization as the basis for 'indicating' the process of 'autopoiesis.'
These last quotations illustrate a point which has proven somewhat problematical over the years. As mentioned at the outset, 'autopoiesis' has in fact been delineated and formally defined in terms of the constitution and operational character of an autopoietic machine or system. This definitional approach was entirely consistent with the mechanicistic perspective from which Maturana and Varela initially proceeded. To have invoked an ephemeral 'autopoiesis' (e.g., as a processual or qualitative referent) would have arguably entailed sliding into the sort of vitalistic explanation which they explicitly opposed and stringently avoided.
In other words, 'autopoiesis' is an abstract construct known solely in relation to a machine / system of a particular constitution which maintains its key constitutive character over time. Strictly speaking, autopoiesis has not been positively defined as a type of process in and of itself, even though it is clear in the context of its primary literature (e.g., Maturana & Varela, 1980) that it is the dynamic or process evidenced by, and reciprocally preservative of, the autopoietic organization / autopoietic machine. Nonetheless, it became common practice (even on occasion by Maturana and Varela themselves) to allude to 'autopoiesis' as a rhetorical shorthand connoting (in terms of process) the constitutive and operational details of a particular system. This is most evident when addressing the dynamics of an autopoietic system -- i.e., when the processes manifest in the autopoietic network comprise the referential foreground, and the mechanics of the network itself are relegated to the background.
Given the above-cited conditions, it is possibly understandable, though definitely somewhat ironic, that this indirectly- or allusively-defined shorthand term should become the de facto label for the essence of Maturana and Varela's work, as well as a common label for that work itself (Cf. 2. below). So long as such invocations retain (or at least can be linked to) the sort of mechanicistic context in which the process 'autopoiesis' is definitively framed, this is not problematical. What is problematical is explanatory invocation (and reliance upon) the process or dynamic of 'autopoiesis' absent this context. To invoke 'autopoiesis' (e.g., as 'self-production') without concomitantly explaining the constitutive elements of the system(s) for which such invocation is made, is to deny any basis for evaluating the applicability of the construct (as it was defined originally). The most well-known example of such an invocation would be that of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who adopted 'autopoiesis' as a processual construct in analyzing social systems, yet never (to date) bothered to explain what in his view are the key constitutive elements (e.g., 'organization', 'structure') by which such an application might be assessed in terms of Maturana and Varela's clear-cut definitional criteria.
The explanatory risk in invoking 'autopoiesis' absent attention to the machine / system manifesting it has two distinguishable (but admittedly intertwined) components. The first is that an observer may simplistically project the feature 'autopoiesis' onto a unity with which she has insufficient or imperfect observational engagement upon which to base its ascription. Phrased another way, stripping the processual construct away from the machine manifesting it opens the possibility of its mistaken attribution to something only partially or indirectly observed. Varela (1979) provides some illustration for this type of risk in writing of recognizing an autopoietic system (as distinct from autonomous systems in general):
"In general, the actual recognition of an autopoietic system poses a cognitive problem that has to do both with the capacity of the observer to recognize the relations that define the system as a unity, and with his capacity to distinguish the boundaries that delimit this unity in the space in which it is realized (his criteria of distinction). Since it is a defining feature of an autopoietic system that it should specify its own boundaries, a proper recognition of an autopoietic system as a unity requires that the observer perform an operation of distinction that defines the limits of the system in the same domain in which it specifies them through its autopoiesis. If this is not the case, he does not observe the autopoietic system as a unity, even though he may conceive it."
(Varela, 1979, p. 54)
The second, but related, explanatory risk has to do with ascribing autopoiesis to systems with which the observer / explainer may have 'proper' observational engagement, but for which the observer ignores addressing the key features of the autopoietic organization by which the process of autopoiesis is defined. Varela (1979) also addresses this issue in passing, during his discussion of ascribing autopoiesis to other (autonomous) systems (i.e., systems of similar apparent constitution or apparent mode of operation, but not 'living systems'). Varela notes that other systems, being autonomous, entail:
"...assertion of the system's identity through its functioning in such a way that observation proceeds through the coupling between the observer and the unit in the domain in which the unity's operation occurs.
What is unsatisfactory about autopoiesis for the characterization of other unities ... is also apparent from this very description. The relations that characterize autopoiesis are relations of productions of components. ... Given this notion of production of components, it follows that the cases of autopoiesis we can actually exhibit, such as living systems or model cases ..., have as a criterion of distinction a topological boundary, and the processes that define them occur in a physical-like space...
Thus, the idea of autopoiesis is, by definition, restricted to relations of productions of some kind, and refers to topological boundaries. These two conditions are clearly unsatisfactory for other systems exhibiting autonomy." [...of which Varela specifically mentions animal societies and human social institutions -- Ed.]
(Varela, 1979, p. 54, emphasis in the original)
The difference between autonomy and autopoiesis is that autopoietic
systems must produce their own components in addition to conserving
their organization . Autonomous machines need only exhibit organizational closure, and they are
not required to produce their own components as part of their operation.
Cf. : allopoiesis, allopoietic machine, autopoietic machine, machine.
-
2.
-
A label sometimes used to denote the body of Maturana and Varela's theoretical work.
Cf. : autopoiesis theory, autopoietic theory, theory of autopoiesis.
-
autopoiesis theory
-
A label for the body of Maturana and Varela's theoretical work,
occurring rarely in the writings of other authors alluding to their
theories.
Cf. : autopoiesis (2.), autopoietic theory, theory of autopoiesis.
-
autopoietic closure
-
A term invoked by Maturana (1978) in summarily characterizing
autopoietic systems. He states autopoietic closure "... is the
condition for autonomy in autopoietic systems in general, and that it
"... is realized through a continuous structural change under conditions
of continuous material interchange with the medium." With regard to the
thermodynamic constraints relevant to the physical space, "...
autopoietic closure in living systems does not imply the violation of
these constraints, but constitutes a particular mode of realization of
autopoiesis in a space in which thermodynamic constraints are valid."
This term is used only within one paragraph in this paper, and as such
it's somewhat difficult to discern whether it is being used as (a) a
summary term for the 'mode of closure' evidenced in autonomous /
autopoietic systems generally, or (b) a specific analogue to more
clearly delineated constructs such as operational closure or
organizational closure. Because the term is invoked specifically to
discuss autonomy , one might make a case that it connotes organizational
closure. However, there is no evidence beyond this to suggest such a
linkage between the two constructs.
Cf. : closure, operational closure, organizational closure
-
autopoietic machine (system)
-
A machine / system which is a member of the class of autonomous systems
and which meets the requirement of being organized (defined as a unity )
as a network of processes of production, transformation and destruction
of components that produces the components which:
(i) through their interactions and transformations regenerate and
realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and
(ii) constitute it as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist
by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a
network. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135, Cf. : Varela,
1979, p. 13)
Any unity meeting these specifications is an autopoietic machine /
system, and any such autopoietic system realized in the physical space is a
living system. The particular substantiation of a given unity -- its
structure -- is not a sufficient factor for making the system "living".
The key feature of a living system is maintenance of its organization,
i.e, preservation of the relational network which defines it as a
systemic unity. Phrased another way, '...autopoietic systems operate as
homeostatic systems that have their own organization as the critical
fundamental variable that they actively maintain constant.' (Maturana,
1975, p. 318)
Varela, Maturana & Uribe (1974) provide a concise set of criteria for determining a machine is an autopoietic machine, arranged as a 6-point key by which one may proceed step-by-step in evaluating autopoiesis for a given unity.
This key is available in the form of the Autopoiesis Checklist at this Website:
http://www.enolagaia.com/Checklist.html
Autopoietic machines are the opposite of allopoietic machines, which are
defined in terms of a purpose other than maintenance of their own
organization. However, an observer can ascribe allopoietic
( allo-referred) status to an autopoietic machine within a subsuming
context. Autopoietic machines may be described or manipulated as
components of "...a larger system that defines the independent events
which perturb them ... [and] can in fact be integrated into a larger
system as a component allopoietic machine, without any alteration in its
autopoietic organization." (Varela, 1979, p. 16) (See Also:
higher-order, second-order, third-order) Conversely, an
observer may analytically decompose an autopoietic machine, treating
each of its "...partial homeostatic and regulatory mechanisms as
allopoietic machines (submachines) by defining their input and output
surfaces." (Varela, 1979, p. 17) Such a decomposition does not sum up
(as a collection of allopoietic submachines) to an appropriate
description of autopoietic machines, because it "...does not reveal the
nature of the domain of interactions that ... [autopoietic machines] ...
define as concrete entities operating in the physical universe."
(Varela, 1979, p. 17)
Cf. : autonomy , autopoiesis , autonomous machine (system), machine
-
autopoietic network
-
A term used by Varela (1979, p. 13) to denote that "...particular network of processes (relations)
of production of components ..." which characterizes an autopoietic machine / system.
-
autopoietic organization
-
The generic term denoting the organization characterizing autopoietic
machines / systems. The term "...simply means processes interlaced in
the specific form of a network of productions of components which
realizing the network that produced them constitute it as a unity."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 80)
Cf. : living organization, organization , organization of the living
-
autopoietic space
-
"An autopoietic organization constitutes a closed domain of relations
specified only with respect to the autopoietic organization that these
relations constitute, and thus it defines a space in which it can be
realized as a concrete system, a space whose dimensions are the
relations of production of the components that realize it."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)
Note that this "autopoietic space" is not isomorphic with the general physical space which is the context for
realization of the composite unity . Perhaps the best interpretation is
to consider an autopoietic space to be analogous to a state space (a
depictive construct for a system's attributes). Maturana and Varela
(1980, pp. 90 ff.) ascribe three dimensions to the autopoietic space,
corresponding to the three classes of relations of production.
Cf. : domain, relations of production, space
-
autopoietic system
-
A synonym for autopoietic machine.
See autopoietic machine
-
autopoietic theory
-
A label for the body of Maturana and Varela's theoretical work. This
label was chosen by Whitaker (1992) to denote this work, and it is the
label of choice used in The Observer Web.
Cf. : autopoiesis (2.), theory of autopoiesis, autopoiesis theory, biology of cognition, Santiago
theory
-
autopoietic unity
-
A synonym for autopoietic machine used particularly in Varela, Maturana & Uribe (1974).
See autopoietic machine
-
-
background
-
A term occasionally invoked in the sense of 'foreground vs. background' to connote that from which a unity is brought forth via an act of distinction. For example:
"The fundamental operation that an observer can perform is an operation
of distinction, the specification of an entity by operationally cleaving
it from a background."
(Maturana, 1978, p. 55)
As such, this term is used more or less colloquially, and not as a formal alternative to (e.g.) ambience or medium.
-
basic circularity
-
A term occasionally invoked to connote the necessarily circular /
cyclical nature of an organizationally-closed system or an aspect
thereof. This term appeared frequently in the early literature with
respect to living systems. (e.g., Maturana, 1970a, p. 5; Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. xiv, 9, 11, 18)
"All the peculiar characteristics of the different kinds of organisms
are superimposed on this basic circularity and are subservient to it,
securing its continuance through successive interactions in an always
changing environment." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5)
For a living system, "...its identity is maintained as long as the basic
circularity that defines the system as a unit of interactions remains
unbroken." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5)
Cf. : circularity, circular organization
-
behavior
-
-
1. (With respect to a system observed):
-
"Any operation or change in operation of an organism in relation to an environment, in any domain in which the observer distinguishes this operation or change in operation, is a behavior or action in this domain."
(Maturana, 1989)
The "...changes of a living being's position or attitude, which an observer describes as movements or actions in
relation to a certain environment." (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 136)
As such, behavior is an observer-ascribed
description of the observed system's apparent transformations within the similarly observer-dependent environment in which the observation occurs.
"...[T]he behavior of an organism is only a description that the observer does of a sequence of postural changes (structural) that the organism exhibits in relation to the medium in which it is observed. These postural changes are expressions of the structural dynamics of the organism, and they appear with the participation of the nervous system when it exists."
(Maturana, 1987, p. 322)
This last quoted passage points to the necessity of bearing in mind that behavior (as ascribed by an observer) must be qualified with respect to the same phenomenal domain juxtaposition as applies to any observation of a composite unity. The following passage illustrates this point, as Maturana discusses the linkage of the living system's two phenomenal domains of realization (as both simple and composite unity) through the cognitive domain of the observer:
"Behaviour, as a relation between a living system operating as a whole and the medium operating as an independent entity, does not take place in the anatomical/physiological domain of the organism, but depends on it. In other words, anatomical/physiological phenomena are necessary for behaviour to happen, but do not determine it because they are involved in the operation of only one of the participants of the dynamics of relations that constitutes it, namely, the living system. It is only the observer that conserves a double look by attending simultaneously, or in succession, to the structural dynamics of a system and to its relations as a whole, who can speak of a generative relation between the processes of the structural dynamics of a living system (anatomy and physiology) and the phenomena of its domain of behaviour."
(Maturana, 1995)
We often overlook these observer-dependent factors when we take
observations of an organism's / system's apparent transformations to
support an explanation of those
transformational events in mentalistic or psychologistic terms. By doing so, we are in fact projecting onto the observed transformational events an explanatory mechanism which is an artifact of our observation. Maturana provides a lucid illustration of this in discussing perception:
"Since the observer distinguishes the organism as a system that moves in a medium, conserving necessarily its structural correspondence with it (adaptation) ... , the observer can distinguish behaviors that appear in the organism associated to its interactions. It is in this context of the association between behavior and medium configured by this distinction that the word perception is habitually used, supposing that such behaviors emerge from the determination of the organism (or of its nervous system), in the level of the sensorial encounter, by an external object."
(Maturana, 1987, p. 322)
The expansion of this basic construct to encompass complex behavioral phenomena proceeds with regard to the typical allusions to circularity and domanial qualification:
"Every kind of behavior is realized through operations that may or may
not be applied recursively. If recursion is possible in a particular
kind of behavior and if it leads to cases of behavior of the same kind,
then a closed generative domain of behavior is produced. There are many
examples: Human dance is one, human language, another."
(Maturana, 1978, p. 52)
-
2. (With respect to the observer):
-
The "... referential and deterministic sequence of states of nervous
activity, in which each state determines the next one within the same
frame of reference." (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 52) More generally,
Maturana characterizes the fundament for an ascription of "behavior"
(1. above) as the ongoing mediation of the nervous
system between the organism's receptor and effector surfaces.
(Cf. Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 26)
-
3.
-
A term used in the more or less colloquial sense of an organism's
"function" or "performance." (Cf. Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela,
1980, p. 31)
-
4.
-
In one specific case, 'behavior' appears as a synonym for conduct (from which this term is more commonly distinguished). This occurs in Maturana and Guiloff (1980, p. 139):
"(v) Conduct or behaviour. The interactions in which it is seen to
enter as well as the active relations that a living system is seen to
adopt while operating (realizing its autopoiesis) within a given
context, and which are described by an observer with reference to this
context, constitute its conduct or behaviour."
Perhaps the most concentrated treatment of "behavior" -- particularly
insofar as it is a phenomenon subject to observation -- is to be found
in Maturana and Guiloff (1980). In this paper, the authors make a
distinction between those behaviors which an observer might distinguish
as acquired / learned versus innate / instinctive. They take care to
point out that this distinction has no necessary bearing on the
fundamental explanation of behavior put forth in autopoietic theory:
"If two living systems have isomorphic structures, then their respective
domains of states as well as their respective domains of perturbations
are also isomorphic, regardless of whether the structure of one living
system was inherited while the structure of the other was acquired
during its ontogeny. The result is that these two living systems under
isomorphic systems of perturbations undergo isomorphic changes of states
that are seen as equivalent conducts by an observer."
(Maturana & Guiloff, 1980, p. 139)
In both cases, the observed behavior of each system is a result of their
structure-specified responses to perturbation. This structural determination is the central (and only)
explanation needed in the context of autopoietic theory.
"...[T]he distinction that we make between instinctive and learned
behaviours has significance only if referred to the different origins of
the individual structures of the organisms concerned (instinctive if
inherited and learned if acquired during ontogeny), and not to the
manner in which the structure of an organism determines its behaviour."
(Maturana & Guiloff, 1980, p. 139)
Cf. : behavioral coupling, conduct, domain of behavioral phenomena
-
behavioral coupling
-
A phenomenon attributed to (e.g.) two autopoietic systems such that:
"...the autopoietic conduct of an organism A becomes a source of
deformation for an organism B, and the compensatory behavior of organism
B acts, in turn, as a source of deformation of organism A, whose
compensatory behavior acts again as a source of deformation of B, and so
on recursively until the coupling is interrupted."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 120)
For all practical purposes, this term can be considered an informal
synonym for reciprocal structural
coupling, albeit it a synonym framed from a distinct referential
vantage. The primary basis for differentiating the constructs is that
one is framed with respect to behavior and the other with respect to
structure . The focus of the former is the organism's attitudinal (or
other parametric) status with respect to its discerned environment, and the focus of the latter is the
internal constitution of the organism.
The complementarity of referential framing evident between behavioral
and structural coupling is analogous to that between deformation and
perturbation. Perhaps it is no more than a derived effect of the
literature's "ontogeny", but it's interesting to point out that the
canonical 1970's treatments of behavioral coupling typically invoke
deformation, whereas the more numerous treatments of structural coupling
typically invoke perturbation. Crudely put for the sake of
illustration, the former case invokes a structural status to explain
something framed as an event, while in the latter case invokes an event
to explain something framed with regard to the participating systems'
structures.
Cf. : structural coupling, deformation, perturbation, consensual domain
-
behavioral view
-
One of the subcategories of cognitive point of view delineated by Varela.
As discussed by Varela (Goguen & Varela, 1978; Varela, 1979), one of two alternative observational vantages on a system and its operation(s) (the other being recursive view). The behavioral view "...reduces a system to its input-output performance or behavior, and reduces the environment to inputs to the system..." and the "...effect of outputs on environment is not taken into account...". In contrast, (with respect to a given system) the recursive view "...emphasizes the mutual interconnectedness of its components..." and "... arises when emphasis is placed on the system's internal structure." (Goguen & Varela, 1978, p. 34; Varela, 1979, p. 86)
"...[T]he behavioral view arises when emphasis is placed on the environment, and recursive view arises when emphasis is placed on the system's internal structure.
If [via the recursive view -- Ed. ] we stress the autonomy of a system Si ... then the environmental influences become perturbations (rather than inputs) which are compensated for through the underlying recursive interdependence of the system's components ... Each such component, however, is treated behaviorally, in terms of some input-output description.
The recursive viewpoint is more sophisticated than the behavioral, since it involves the simultaneous consideration of three different levels [i.e.: component / system-whole / environment -- Ed. ], whereas the behavioral strictly speaking involves only two [i.e.: system-whole / environment -- Ed. ]. ... [E]xpressing interest in how the system achieves its behavior through the interdependent action of its parts adds a new distinction, between the system and its parts."
(Goguen & Varela, 1978, p. 34)
The cognitive point of view (CPOV) conforming to the behavioral view is illustrated in Tableau BehView.
A summary illustration of the dichotomy between behavioral and recursive views can be found in Figure CPOV.
Both these illustrations can be accessed on the Inside versus Outside Focus File here at the Observer Web.
http://www.enolagaia.com/UnityInOut.html
Although the foundation for the behavioral / recursive view dichotomy can be discerned in the primary literature going back to Maturana (1970a), it is neither so explicitly addressed, nor even invoked, as in the Varela sources cited here. Maturana's subsequent analyses of phenomena such as languaging and (most particularly) the hierarchical evolution of self-consciousness through recursive linguistic behavior could have been considerably more lucid had this (or an equivalent) logical accounting for indexicality been employed.
Cf. : cognitive point of view, recursive view
-
being
-
-
1.
-
A term which appears colloquially in The Tree of Knowledge (Maturana & Varela, 1992) as an apparent synonym for 'object', 'entity', and/or 'unity'. Cf. p. 40:
"The act of indicating any being, object, thing, or unity involves making an act of distinction ... Each time we refer to anything ... we are specifying a criterion of distinction, which indicates what we are talking about and specifies its properties as being, unity, or object."
-
2.
-
Used in a more specific sense, a term connoting a specimen of a living system -- typically in the phrase "living being".
Nowhere in the primary literature is 'being' defined in such a way as to give it any special connotation distinct from 'unity' or 'entity'. Similarly, the primary literature does not explicitly address 'being' in any specific sense as an ontic unit (i.e., a being) or as an ontological state or quality of existence (i.e., being). As such, the often-suggested parallels or linkages between autopoietic theory and (e.g.) Heideggerian phenomenological philosophy are not explicitly suggested by any invocation of the term 'being' by Maturana and/or Varela.
Cf. : entity, unity
-
biological explanation
-
"A reformulation in terms of processes subordinated to autopoiesis, that is, a reformulation in the
biological phenomenological domain." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)
-
biological phenomenology
-
A term for the phenomenology characteristic of living systems,
i.e.,"...the phenomenology of autopoietic systems in the physical
space..." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135) Biological phenomenology is
a specific instance of the general class of mechanical phenomenology --
"...a phenomenology of relations between processes realized through the
properties of components" (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 112), and not the
properties themselves. Varela (1979, p. 31) focuses the scope of
application for this term when he claims, "All the biological
phenomenology is necessarily determined and realized through individuals
(that is, through autopoietic unities in the physical space), and
consists in all the paths of transformations that they undergo, singly
or in groups, in the process of maintaining invariant their individual
defining relations."
"...[A]utopoietic unities specify biological phenomenology as the phenomenology proper of those unities with features distinct from physical phenomenology. This is so, not because autopoietic unities go against any aspect of physical phenomenology -- since their molecular components must fulfill all physical laws -- but because the phenomena they generate in functioning as autopoietic unities depend on their organization and the way this organization comes about, and not on the physical nature of their components (which only determine their space of existence."
(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 51)
Given this focus by Varela, the attribution of a biological
phenomenology to a composite unity will be contingent on the level of
composition at which autopoiesis is realized. In other words, a composite unity which either (a) subsumes components which (in and of themselves) exhibit autopoiesis and/or (b) exhibits autonomy as a whole may or may not exhibit a biological phenomenology, subject to certain conditions:
"[I]f a new unity is
produced that is not autopoietic, its phenomenology, which will
necessarily depend on its organization, will be biological or not
according to its dependence on the autopoiesis of its components, and
will accordingly depend or not depend on the maintenance of these as
autopoietic units. If the new unity is autopoietic, then its
phenomenology is biological and obviously depends on the maintenance of
its autopoiesis, which in turn may or may not depend on the autopoiesis
of its components."
(Varela, 1979, p. 31)
This passage is not restricted to higher-order autopoietic systems, in
which autopoiesis is realized at two or more levels of composition. A
higher-order autopoietic system would be of the sort addressed in the
final sentence -- where the composite unity is autopoietic, provided the
maintenance of the composite depended on the autopoiesis of its
(autopoietic) components.
Cf. : component, higher-order (autopoietic system), biological phenomenon, mechanical phenomenology, phenomenology, statical phenomenology
-
biological phenomenon
-
The label for a subject of enquiry whose character is contingent upon,
of reflective of, the constitutive nature of living systems. Although
the usage of the term is more or less informal, it is important because
it denotes the particular interpretive stance from which all of
autopoietic theory proceeds.
The earliest paper in the primary literature (Maturana, 1970) begins by
stating, "Cognition is a biological phenomenon and can only be
understood as such; any epistemological insight in the domain of
knowledge requires this understanding." (p. 3) This opening
declaration paved the way for the theoretical development of the biology
of cognition. Once the core construct of autopoiesis was introduced and
fleshed out, biological phenomena themselves would then be delineated
with respect to the product of their scrutiny:
"... [A] phenomenon is a
biological phenomenon only to the extent that it depends in one way or
another on the autopoiesis of one or more physical autopoietic unities."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)
[Biological phenomena] "...are
necessarily phenomena of relations between processes which satisfy the
autopoiesis of the participant living systems. Accordingly, under no
circumstances is a biological phenomenon defined by the properties of
its component elements."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 113)
"...[A] biological phenomenon will be any phenomenon that involves the autopoiesis of at least one living being."
(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 52)
Cf. : biological phenomenology
-
biology of cognition
-
A label for the corpus of Maturana and Varela's seminal work during the 1970's. This label is the
preferred nomenclature of Maturana and his colleagues in Chile.
Cf. : autopoiesis (2.), autopoiesis theory, autopoietic theory, Santiago theory, theory of autopoiesis
-
boundary
-
The interface which demarcates the extent of a system / unity in
contrast to its subsuming medium of realization. For example, "the
organism ends at the boundary that its self-referring organization
defines in the maintenance of its identity." (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980,
p. 20)
The recourse to "boundaries" is based on the idea that autopoietic
systems, through their processes of self-production, delineate a
"topology" in the space of their operations. If the observer observes
an autopoietic entity with respect to the dimensions in which its
processes of topological production are manifested, this topological
boundary is discernible via the closure of the entity's constituent
processes. As such, the construct of "boundary" connotes the
self-circumscription of an organizationally-closed system in the context
of its environment (as ascribed by an
observer). A "boundary" is not, then, strictly held to be a discernible
"sheath" or "shell" (i.e., a bounding component of the system's
structure ), though such structural manifestations of the system's
boundary may be evident.
-
-
calculus of indications
-
The label for the logical system introduced by George Spencer Brown in his book Laws of Form (1969; 1994), predicated upon the operator termed a 'mark' which denotes a distinction between 'marked' and 'unmarked' states. Varela (e.g., 1975, 1979; Varela & Goguen, 1978), by equating Spencer Brown's 'mark' with an operational viewpoint on distinction, explored the calculus of indications as a candidate tool for applying autopoietic theory. In doing so, Varela found it necessary to introduce a new logical operator denoting 're-entry' (within a nested series of marks) of a subsumed / subsequent mark back into the series at a point corresponding to a subsuming / precedent mark. The composite system of Spencer Brown's calculus, as augmented by Varela, was labeled the extended calculus of indications (ECI). According to Varela & Goguen (1978), even this ECI proved unwieldy in application (albeit sound logically). These two authors then sketched a reformulation of the extension of Spencer Brown's work to address the distinction of systemic unities as wholes. This subsequent modification of the calculus of indications was labeled the complete calculus of indications (CI).
Though intriguingly salient to autopoietic theory, the calculus of indications is external to the primary corpus of autopoietic theory, and it will not be discussed in any further detail within the Encyclopaedia. Readers interested in exploring this substantial campaign by Varela are encouraged to read Laws of Form, Principles of Biological Autonomy (Varela, 1979), and/or the papers cited herein. Additional materials relevant to the calculus of indications are listed in the Observer Web's Bibliography and Guide to Internet Resources.
-
causality
-
A notion which appears in some of Maturana's earliest writings, but
which he strenuously excised thereafter, because it was inadequate and
misleading. "It was inadequate because the notion of causality is a
notion that pertains to the domain of descriptions, and as such it is
relevant only in the metadomain in which the observer makes his
commentaries and cannot be deemed to be operative in the phenomenal
domain, the object of the description." (Maturana, in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p.
xviii)
More specifically, Maturana considered it misleading because it obscured:
- "... the actual appreciation of the sufficiency of the notion of property as defined by the distinctive
operation performed by the observer when specifying a unity ...
- ... the understanding of the dependency of the identity of the unity on the distinctive operation
that specified it.
- ... the understanding of the phenomenal domains as determined by the properties of the unities
that generate them
- ... the non-intersection of the phenomenal domains generated by the operation of a composite
unity as a simple unity in a medium and by the operation of its components as components."
(Maturana, in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xviii, vertical spacing added for readability)
-
changes of state
-
A term used colloquially throughout the primary literature to denote transformations or transitions undergone (or potentially undergone) by a composite unity. Only later has this term come to be treated as a specific piece of terminology in itself:
"We call the structural changes that occur in a system with conservation of organization, changes of state; and those that occur with loss of organization, disintegrations."
(Maturana, Mpodozis & Letelier, 1995)
-
circular organization
-
An early (and generic) label describing the essentially recursive,
cyclical nature of living systems (Cf.
circularity). According to Maturana, the notion of this "circular
organization" was the conceptual seed for what would later be formally
termed autopoiesis (Cf. Maturana, in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p.
xvii). The following passage indicates that what was originally termed
"circular organization" in essence became the formal term organization :
"Living systems as they exist on earth today are characterized by
exergonic metabolism, growth and internal molecular replication, all
organized in a closed causal circular process that allows for
evolutionary change in the way the circularity is maintained, but not
for the loss of the circularity itself. ... This circular organization
constitutes a homeostatic system whose function is to produce and
maintain this very same circular organization by determining that the
components that specify it are those whose synthesis or maintenance it
secures. ...Furthermore, this circular organization defines a living
system as a unit of interactions and is essential for its maintenance as
a unit ..."
(Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 9)
Cf. : autopoiesis , circularity, homeostasis, organization
-
circularity
-
-
1.
-
A term employed to connote closure, particular with respect to form
(e.g., organization ) or dynamics (e.g., operations or processes). The
construct of "circularity" occurs frequently in the literature as a
description for a process or path which is closed upon itself (in the
sense of eventually returning to the point of its origin). This in turn
sets the stage for a necessary cyclicity in systems exhibiting such
circular form: "The circularity of their organization continuously
brings them back to the same internal state (same with respect to the
cyclic process)." (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 10)
Because autonomous and autopoietic systems exhibit organizational
closure, circularity and cyclicity are important aspects of their
description. "It is the circularity of its organization that makes a
living system a unit of interactions, and it is this circularity that it
must maintain in order to remain a living system and to retain its
identity through different interactions." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5;
Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 9) This explains why Maturana made
circularity a central theme beginning with his earliest writings on a
novel approach to analyzing living systems. "All the peculiar
characteristics of the different kinds of organisms are superimposed on
this basic circularity and are subservient to it, securing its
continuance through successive interactions in an always changing
environment." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5)
Because such systems are self-organizing, -referential, -maintaining,
etc., their operations cannot be fully explained without recourse to
circularity. As such, "circularity" is a generic explanatory theme
necessitated by the form of Maturana and Varela's approach, and it is a
necessary theme in approaching self-organization . Jantsch (1980,
Chapter 10) extensively explores circularity (and cyclicity) in this
general sense.
Cf. : basic circularity, circular organization,
-
2.
-
A term connoting a paradoxical state of referential or explanatory
"looping" -- specifically, that state of affairs confronting all
scientific studies of cognition -- that the object of study (the human
"mind") is also the instrument by which that study is conducted.
Maturana alludes to this sense of circularity most succinctly in saying
of cognition and language (as instruments of addressing cognition and
language themselves):
"These two experiential conditions are my
starting point because I must be in them in any explanatory attempt;
they are my problem because I choose to explain them; and they are my
unavoidable instruments because I must use cognition and language in
order to explain cognition and language."
(Maturana, 1988a)
The most specific label for this particular sense (of referential / explanatory paradox) is fundamental circularity.
-
3.
-
A term used to negatively characterize a path of argumentation or course of reasoning -- typically on the figurative basis of said path's 'circling back on itself' to explain or demonstrate something which in fact was employed earlier as a foundational element. An example is the common colloquial indictment of 'presuming as given that which one sets out to prove'. Given the above-cited basic and fundamental circularities which Maturana and Varela's chosen foci entail, critics of their work have often claimed that their proffered line(s) of explanation, by virtue of following the circular contours of their subject matter, are guilty of this presumptively erroneous / fallacious method.
Frankly, most such charges appear to derive from a confusion of explanatory circularity (i.e, 'circular reasoning') with the above-cited intrinsic forms of circularity. To be fair, however, some further comments should be offered as a more substantive basis for rebuttal. Because Maturana's formulations of 'reason', 'rationality', and 'theory' all rely on the general construct of 'explanation', these comments will be framed with regard to this last, and most relevant, topic.
To the extent that 'circular reasoning' is isomorphic with 'explaining exactly what you already assume', one might well rebut such claims by pointing out that a priori assumptions (objects, values, claims) are relegated by Maturana (e.g., 1991) to the class of philosophical explanations -- the opposite of the class of scientific explanations into which he claims his theories properly fall. To the extent 'circular reasoning' connotes pre-specification of what is to be addressed, one must concede this is an intrinsic component of Maturana's scientific method (as the first element in his criteria of validation for scientific explanations). However, this would lead to 'circular reasoning' only to the extent that the phenomenon initially specified as the focus of explanation was itself employed as a component of its own explanation. Maturana specifically forbids such a thing when he writes: "A proposed explanation which explicitly or implicitly includes the phenomenon to be explained as a feature of the proposed system [i.e., model offered as the explanatory hypothesis -- Ed.], is not a scientific explanation." (Maturana & Guiloff, 1980, p. 137)
-
class
-
Several of the theoretical constructs (e.g., domain) are delineated with
respect to "classes" of (e.g.) interactions. In this sense, the term
"class" appears in the literature with its colloquial meaning of a
delineating or definitive set. Most specifically, the construct of
organization is repeatedly stated to define the "class" or "class
identity" of the system to which it pertains.
"The organization of a system, then, specifies the class identity of a
system, and must remain invariant for the class identity of the system
to remain invariant: if the organization of a system changes, then its
identity changes and it becomes a unity of another kind."
(Maturana, in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xx)
"...[T]he organization of a composite unity specifies the class of
entities to which it belongs. It follows that the concept or generic
name that we use to refer to a class of entities points to the
organization of the composite unities that are members of the class."
(Maturana, 1978)
Another allusion to "class" concerns the character of cognition afforded
by an autopoietic system's circular organization, "... which treats
every interaction and the internal state that it generates as if it were
to be repeated, and as if an element of a class. (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela,
1980, pp. 49-50) Most specifically, when we as observers distinguish a
composite unity , we are in effect distinguishing a class. "This
situation, in which we recognize implicitly or explicitly the
organization of an object when we indicate it or distinguish it, is
universal in the sense that it is something we do constantly as a basic
cognitive act, which consists no more and no less than in generating
classes of any type." (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 43)
Both the cited general and specific intersections of "class" and
cognition imply a primary generality of orientational / referential /
distinction-making behavior. Phrased another way, this implies that the
observer observes from a fundamentally general stance, rather than
lacing together multiple specific instances to arrive at the general.
This implication is nowhere more explicitly reinforced than when
Maturana and Varela state "... functionally, for a living system every
experience is the experience of a general case, and it is the particular
case, not the general one, which requires many independent experiences
in order that it be specified through the intersection of various
classes of interactions." (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 49-50)
These allusions to "class" are invoked for the purposes of discussion
and explanation. Nowhere in the literature is there an extensive
treatment of whether (much less how) this could relate to (e.g.)
discernment of "classes" by an observer in (e.g.) ordering her cognitive
domain, making inferences, etc. As such, the notion of "class" is not
pursued (to any great extent) in the direction of linking it to
set-theoretical notions descriptive of cognitive (particularly
inferential) phenomena. Such discussion is limited to only a few
instances (e.g., Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 49 ff. -- Cf. :
inference)
This relatively low attention to developing the role of "class" in
autopoietic theory is not surprising, given that a dominant theme of the
theory is the autonomy of the subject system. From such a perspective,
it is sufficient to invoke the "class"-like character of interaction as
the basis for behavioral / orientational flexibility. Fuller treatment
of "class" in a formal (particularly a set- theoretic) sense lies beyond
the scope of autopoietic theory's focus, because it would entail (a)
requisite characterization of that lying beyond or outside the
autonomous system, and (b) an allusion to some abstract feature of class
subsumption -- in effect what Varela calls a symbolic description.
Cf. : inference, organization , unity
-
class identity
-
A term used to connote the character of a system as being one of (possibly multiple) such unities
defined by its organization .
Cf. : class, identity, organization
-
closed system
-
A traditional cybernetics term connoting a system which is hermetically
isolated with respect to environmental influence (e.g., impervious to
external "feedback"), and hence not responsive or adaptive to its medium
over time. The opposite of an "open system" (in the same traditional
terminology).
Critics of Maturana and Varela have interpreted the
defining closure of autonomous / autopoietic systems to indicate these
are "closed systems" in the traditional sense. This is quite simply not
the case, and results from (a) a misinterpretation of Maturana and
Varela's terminology and (b) inattention to the manner in which the
explanatory constructs underlying a traditional ascription of system
"openness" (e.g., feedback) are addressed in autopoietic theory.
"Please note that when we speak of organizational closure, by no means do we imply interactional closure, i.e., the system in total isolation. We do assume that every system will maintain endless interactions with the environment which will impinge and perturb it. If this were not so, we could not even distinguish it."
(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 294, emphasis in the original)
Cf. : closure, feedback, organizational closure, stability
-
closure
-
The quality or property of a descriptive network N such that one or
another of the constituent elements of N (depicted or described as
mappings onto N) interconnect wholly within the confines (explicit or
implicit) of N itself. This circumscribes the set of constituent
elements (or a collective designatum depicted through this set) such
that its extent corresponds to the extent of N. In a complementary
fashion, this circumscription induces (or is intended to portray) a
circumscription of N itself on the basis of the depicted constituent(s).
The stereotypical examples in the literature are: (1) operational closure (where N is a network of constituent operations); and (2)
organizational closure (where N depicts the network of processes
constituting a system's organization ).
It is important to note that this property of 'closure' does not make
autonomous / autopoietic systems 'closed' in the classic cybernetic
sense of isolated from the environment or
impervious to environmental influence. 'Closure' doesn't mean
autonomous systems are unresponsive; it only means that their changes of
state in response to changes in their medium are realized and propagated
solely within the network of processes constituting them (as they are
defined). The difference has more to do with the way a system is
defined than how that system (once defined) operates.
"Please note that when we speak of organizational closure, by no means do we imply interactional closure, i.e., the system in total isolation. We do assume that every system will maintain endless interactions with the environment which will impinge and perturb it. If this were not so, we could not even distinguish it."
(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 294, emphasis in the original)
A fuller explanation of this point can be obtained in Varela (1979, pp.
56 ff.), who frames the issue in terms of delineating a systemic unity
such that the scope of the defined unity subsumes all processes which
operationally define it. For example, in organizational closure the
network of defining processes is internal to the system as
circumscribed. This includes those processes of system "feedback",
which in traditional cybernetics are defined as external to a system --
in either the sense that (a) they are channels for "information" from
without (i.e., the 'environment') or (b) they are defined as extrinsic
or secondary to the constitutive nature of the system.
Cf. : feedback, organizational closure, operational closure, stability
-
Closure Thesis
-
"Every autonomous system is organizationally closed."
(Varela, 1979, p. 58, emphasis in the original)
"Every system-whole is organizationally closed."
(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 293)
The Closure Thesis is a central component of Varela's solo theoretical work of the 1970's. Both the 'system-whole' and 'autonomous system' constructs cited above denote composite unities of the sort which 'systems theory' has taken as its topical focus. The emphasis on organization clearly derives from the seminal work in delineating autopoietic machines, and the usage of that term is entirely consistent with its invocation here. The Closure Thesis represents an axiomatic basis upon which to extend the notion of 'organization' and its closure as evidenced in those systems (both natural and artificial) of interest to the stature of a feature definitive of those same systems. The following excerpt from Varela & Goguen (1978) summarizes the rationale for such an extension:
"Question: What have we learned from the descriptions of system-wholes in the last decade? Answer: That in order to account for the coherence of the observed systems, their constitutive interactions must be mutual and reciprocal, so as to become an interconnected network.
There seems to be plenty of evidence to substantiate this view of system-wholes. The traditional source of examples has been living systems. Surely in them the circularity of interconnectedness is more striking than anywhere else, both topologically and functionally. But, biological systems are not unique in this respect, and the current interest in ecological wholeness and world models are testimony to our growing understanding of this. ...
In terms of organization, then, empirical observation reveals that the system-wholes are organizationally closed: their organization is a circular network of interactions rather than a tree of hierarchical processes.
Conversely, then, if we are trying to make more precise our notion of a whole, we propose to make these empirical results a guideline. That is, we propose to take the circular and mutual interconnectedness of organization, or organizational closure, as the characterization of system-wholes."
(Varela & Goguen, 1978, pp. 292-293, emphasis in the original)
This thesis was then developed in the light of organizational closure itself as well as the corollary constructs of (a) criteria of distinction / indication (by which a system-whole is identified by an observer), and (b) stability (as specifically re-defined). After addressing the criticisms typically leveled at their approach (cf. Note below), they conclude:
"In summary: we have the three interrelated notions of criteria of indication, systemic stability, and organizational closure. They appear related thus: given a criterion for distinction, system-wholes can be identified by their stable properties, and empirical experience tells us that such stability is due to organizational closure. Whence the Closure Thesis, that can be now restated in a second, less compact form:
Every (distinguishable) system-whole is (distinguishable through its stable properties arising from it being) organizationally closed."
(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 295)
NOTE: For more detailed discussion of Varela & Goguen's rebuttal of two conventional criticisms as they apply to the Closure Thesis, i.e.: (a) 'Are organizationally closed unities 'closed systems'?'; and (b) 'Aren't 'inputs' and 'outputs' necessary components of a system?', refer to the entries for operational closure and feedback, respectively.
By declaring the Closure Thesis and exploring its ramifications, Varela (alone and in concert with J. Goguen) generated a basis for critiquing classical cybernetics / engineering approaches to systems. In these earlier approaches, the systems' essential circularity is not acknowledged, or is acknowledged only in terms of imperfect constructs such as feedback. By not addressing circularity as an intrinsic element of their models, adherents of these approaches are left to lay out specifications of a system in 'linear' terms / referents -- a tactic only made possible by 'punctuating' (to use Bateson's terminology) circular paths and flows with constructs such as 'input' and 'output' so as to filter out circularity in favor of more tractable (if less faithful) models and schemata. Given the distortions which may ensue, this 'punctuation' may be more properly considered 'puncturing'.
The Closure Thesis requires one to prioritize the subject system's organizational closure, which in turn mandates direct attention to this circularity. What, then, might this connote for reforming systems analysis and engineering?
"The Closure Thesis, we submit, is a methodological guideline: if you are to study a system, assume it has a closed organization, analyze individual pathways until a reconstruction of the network is obtained, and then putting all of these circuits together simultaneously, see what kinds of stability they can generate. The i/o [i.e., input/output -- Ed.] approach is, in fact, a moment in this process, insofar as we fix certain modes of interaction with a purpose in mind."
(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 318)
Cf. : closure, feedback, organization, organizational closure, operational closure, stability, system, system-whole
-
coding
-
"A notion which represents the interactions of the observer, not a
phenomenon operative in the observed domain. A mapping of a process
that occurs in the space of autopoiesis onto a process that occurs in
the space of human beings (heteropoiesis) and, thus, not a reformulation
of the phenomenon."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)
The term "coding" is generally used to denote the symbolic
inter-mappings associated with a cognitivist view of communication
(e.g., the metaphor of the tube). The autopoietic account of
communication as languaging denies that coding is the essence of such
communicative interactions.
Cf. : communication, language, languaging, metaphor of the tube
-
cognition
-
"Cognition is a biological phenomenon and can only be understood as such; any epistemological
insight in the domain of knowledge requires this understanding."
(Maturana, 1970a, p. 3)
"Any understanding of the cognitive process must account for the observer and his role in it."
(Maturana, 1970a, p. 4)
These two declarations from the earliest document in the literature base
succinctly delineate the foundation for Maturana and Varela's
autopoietic account of those events or phenomena we term "cognition".
First, whatever cognition may be, it is most definitely a biological
phenomenon -- i.e., it is a characteristic of those systems we label
"living", and which have been made the province of biological science.
Second, there is no explanation for "cognition" which avoids being
discerned, analyzed, or expressed by one of the living systems
manifesting that selfsame phenomenon. Addressing cognition as an
impersonal or objective subject, absent grounding in the unavoidable
groundedness of experience, cannot possibly encompass the topic.
Maturana and Varela proceeded from the perspective of individual
organisms' cognitive activities as a function of their embodied
experience. For them, cognition is a consequence of circularity and
complexity in the form of any system whose behavior realizes maintenance
of that selfsame form. This shifts the weight of discussion from
discernment of those active agencies and replicable actions through
which a given process ("cognition") is conducted (the viewpoint of
cognitivism) to the discernment of those features of an organism's form
which determine that entity's engagement with its milieu. In other
words, cognition is a matter of interacting in the manner(s) in which
one is capable of interacting, not processing what is objectively there
to be seen. "Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a
process is a process of cognition." (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13)
In this view, cognition is a consequence of (structurally-realized and
structurally-determined) interactions. "A cognitive system is a system
whose organization defines a domain of interactions in which it can act
with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and the process of
cognition is the actual (inductive) acting or behaving in this domain."
(Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13) More specifically:
"... for every living system the process of cognition consists in the
creation of a field of behavior through its actual conduct in its closed
domain of interactions, and not in the apprehension or the description
of an independent universe. Our cognitive process (the cognitive
process of the observer) differs from the cognitive processes of other
organisms only in the kinds of interactions into which we can enter, ...
and not in the nature of the cognitive process itself."
(Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 49)
In other words, the foundation for the autopoietic view of cognition is
not "information" as some quantum commodity available in the environment. Owing to this, autopoietic theory
diverges from some interpolations of J. J. Gibson's (e.g., 1979)
otherwise similar ecological approach (Cf. Varela,
Thompson & Rosch, 1991, pp. 202-204). Unlike cognitivism, autopoietic
theory does not rely upon a formalizable model of information or symbol
processing (Cf. Varela, et al., 1991) to describe
cognition as information processing or communication as a matter of
coding. Autopoietic theory also diverges from "classical" cybernetics
in the sense that it does not treat system behavior as being regulated
by a traffic in "information" -- e.g., "feedback" -- See Also:
Varela, 1979, p. 56).
Cf. : class, cognitive domain, description, explanation, inference, language, languaging, observer
-
cognitive domain
-
"The domain of all the interactions in which an autopoietic system can
enter without loss of identity is its cognitive domain; or, in other
words, the cognitive domain of an autopoietic system is the domain of
all the descriptions which it can possibly make"
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 119)
This latter allusion to descriptions primarily applies only to an
autopoietic system which can operate as an observer.
It is sometimes difficult to maintain a clear distinction between a
system's cognitive domain and its domain of interactions (" the domain
of all the deformations that it may undergo without loss of autopoiesis"
(Ibid.)) or its phenomenological domain. This confusion derives in
large part from the generality of their definitions. A phenomenological
domain is a general explanatory construct denoting the realm specified
by the properties of a unity or one or more classes of unities
(Cf. Varela, 1979, pp. 46-47). Crudely stated, the
phenomenological domain is the domain in which the unity is extant in
and of itself -- the totality of its context of simple or static
realization, and the background to its dynamic realization. A domain of
interactions is a distinct explanatory construct denoting the realm
specified by "...the particular mode through which its autopoiesis is
realized in the space of its components, that is, by its structural
coupling." (Varela, 1979, p. 47) Crudely stated, the domain of
interactions is the domain in which the unity can act (change; undergo
deformation). A cognitive domain, crudely stated, is the domain in
which the unity can, and does, adapt in the course of its ontogeny.
Cf. : cognition, domain of interactions, description, phenomenological domain
-
cognitive phenomenon
-
A term employed colloquially to denote those capacities we associate
with perception, thinking, and other aspects of a human's abilities --
particularly those aspects conventionally treated as symbolic
information processing under the rubric of cognitivism. The
personally-ascribed elements or events evidencing the character of
semantic phenomena. A good illustration of this usage can be found in
Maturana (1980a, p. 46), where he states an emphasis on systemic
autonomy requires that one:
"...treat cognitive phenomena (such as language or perception) as
structural phenomena by formulating them as phenomena of ontogenic or
phylogenic adaptation, resulting from ontogenic or phylogenic structural
selection, rather than as phenomena of transfer of information,
communication, or meaning. These, as semantic phenomena, cannot be
handled by biology."
Cf. : semantic phenomena
-
cognitive point of view / cognitive viewpoint
-
A pair of terms used by Varela to denote the particular perspective, viewpoint,
or vantage established and maintained by an observer (-community) in the
course of enquiry. The initial definition is given with respect to the form 'cognitive point of view':
"...[T]he establishment of system boundaries is inescapably associated
with what I shall call a cognitive point of view, that is, a particular
set of presuppositions and attitudes, a perspective, or a frame in the
sense of Bateson ... or Goffman ...; in particular, it is associated
with some notion of value, or interest. It is also linked up with the
cognitive capacities (sensory capabilities, knowledge background) of the
distinctor. Conversely, the distinctions made reveal the cognitive capabilities of the distinctor. It is in this way that biological and social structures exhibit their coherence..."
(Varela, 1979, p. 85; Goguen & Varela, p. 32)
Because the phrase 'cognitive point of view' is more commonly invoked by Varela than 'cognitive viewpoint', this will be the term employed for discussion herein. For the sake of economy, it will be abbreviated CPOV.
A CPOV, therefore, circumscribes the particular 'layout' or 'topology' of an observer's observing situation. This circumscription specifies the focus of observational engagement (i.e., where the observer's 'referential cross hairs' are targeted), and this in turn specifies the topology of the observer's immediately-accessible domain of referentiality. These constraining or qualifying features are best illustrated in the context in which the CPOV was originally introduced. In Goguen and Varela (1978), the discursive focus was on "...the role which distinction plays in the creation and recognition of systems." (Goguen & Varela, 1978, p. 32) As such, they introduce and employ the notion of CPOV in the course of delineating how such observational constraints set the stage for a hierarchy of system levels (of discernment). This in turn set the stage for discussion of issues such as the dichotomies of autonomy / control and recursive / behavioral views on a system and its operations.
I've prepared a graphic summary illustration of this construct, including comparison of the behavioral and recursive subcategories.
This illustration can be accessed on the Inside versus Outside Focus File here at the Observer Web.
http://www.enolagaia.com/UnityInOut.html
Cf. : behavioral view, observer, observer-community, phenomenology, phenomenological domain, recursive view
-
cognitive system
-
"A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of
interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of
itself ..."
(Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13)
This is the basis for the process of cognition, as delineated in
autopoietic theory. It is important to note that this basic definition
frames capacity for cognition in terms of a system's formal character
(its organization ) insofar as this is reflected in the scope of events
into which it can enter while maintaining this character. This divorces
autopoietic theory's notion of cognition from those elements most
commonly cited in conventional, cognitivistic accounts: "information",
'symbols', and the "processing" of these things as the hallmark of
cognitive activity.
Cf. : cognition, cognitive domain
-
cognitive viewpoint
-
A synonym for cognitive point of view.
-
communication
-
-
1. [General usage]
-
Those "...coordinated behaviors mutually triggered among the members of
a social unity." (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 193) The phenomenon
ascribed to the inter-organism behavioral coordination which an observer
construes as communicative. (Cf. Maturana &
Varela, 1992, p. 195)
-
2. [Specific usage, in contrast with simple "interaction"]
-
In this more specific usage, the term "communication" is employed to
analyze what distinguishes "communicative" behaviors (See Also:
1.).
In this usage, communication is behavior entailing orientation which is
contrastively opposed to simple or automatic "interaction" wherein
interactors are basically triggering each other's responses. In
communication (in this sense), one organism orients "...the behavior of
the other organism to some part of its domain of interactions different
from the present interaction, but comparable to the orientation of that
of the orienting organism." (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 27) Note that
the orientation of interest is not necessarily to some external
referent, but to some distinguishable subregion of the domain of
interactions. "This can take place only if the domains of interactions
of the two organisms are widely coincident; in this case no interlocked
chain of behavior [i.e., no "interaction" in the simple sense -- Ed.] is
elicited because the subsequent conduct of the two organisms depends on
the outcome of independent, although parallel, interactions. (Maturana, 1970b: reprinted in Maturana
& Varela, 1980, pp. 27-28)
Cf. : orientation
-
communicative
-
An attribution for "...those behaviors which occur in social coupling."
(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 195) Roughly speaking, one could associate
communicative behaviors with second-order structural coupling, although
Maturana and Varela don't make such an ascription in any strong or
exclusive way.
-
communicative domain
-
"A chain of interlocked interactions such that although the conduct of
each organism in each interaction is internally determined by its
autopoietic organization, this conduct is for the other organism a
source of compensable deformations."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 136)
Cf. : consensual domain, structural coupling, perturbation.
-
communicative explanations
-
A term used by Varela (1979) as a synonym for symbolic explanations.
Cf. : explanation
-
compensation
-
The term applied to connote the manner in which a unity responds to
perturbations / deformations while maintaining its organization , its
identity, and its integrity. The exogenous influences that the system
thus survives are compensable. These are 'compensable' in the senses
that (a) there is a range of 'compensation' bounded by the limit beyond
which each system ceases to be a functional whole (i.e., it
disintegrates) and (b) each compensatory iteration is impelled (to
occur) by and/or affected (in its manner of accomplishment) by the
status resultant from prior events in the unity's ontogeny.
Compensation is not "absolute" in the sense that any or all arbitrary
parameters or ordering arrangements are recovered after deformation /
perturbation. With regard to autopoietic systems in particular,
compensation is sufficient if the unity or system's organization is
preserved:
"...[A]ny deformation at any place is not compensated by bringing the
system back to an identical state of its components as it would be
described by projecting it upon a three-dimensional Cartesian space;
rather it is compensated by keeping its organization constant as defined
by the relation of the relations of production of relations of
constitution, specification, and order which constitutes autopoiesis.
In other words, compensation of deformation keeps the autopoietic system
in the autopoietic space."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 92-93)
Cf. : perturbation, , ontogeny, compensatory change
-
compensatory behavior
-
That behavior of a system which effects a compensation with respect to
perturbations or deformations. This construct is specifically invoked
in discussing behavioral coupling among two or more autopoietic systems,
wherein:
"...the autopoietic conduct of an organism A becomes a
source of deformation for an organism B, and the compensatory behavior of organism B acts, in
turn, as a source of deformation of organism A, whose compensatory behavior acts again as a
source of deformation of B, and so on recursively..."
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 120)
Cf. : behavioral coupling, compensation, deformation, perturbation, structural coupling
-
compensatory change
-
The changes an autopoietic system may effect or undergo while
maintaining its identity and integrity. (Cf.
Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 99 ff.) Phrased another way -- all those
modifications which a given system may tolerate via compensation (i.e.,
without disintegration). The two subclasses of compensatory change are
conservative change and innovative change. Because this construct
pertains to the status or character of the system (as opposed to the
event(s) which affect it), it is closely linked to the notion of
deformation.
Cf. : compensation, deformation, perturbation, conservative change, innovative change
-
complementarity
-
-
1.
-
A relation between descriptions such that they comprise a mutually
defining duality -- i.e., that one is the obverse of the other, but
neither is entirely addressable in isolation. Varela (1979)
characterizes this duality as being based on "...how things are put
together and related through our descriptions, not losing track of the
fact that every 'it' can be seen on a diffe
